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Abstract—In recent years, there has been a growing interest
in considering the probabilistic aspects of Information Flow. In
this abstract we review some of the main approaches that have
been considered to quantify the notion of information leakage,
and we focus on some recent developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the concerns in the use of computer systems is
to avoid the leakage of secret information through public
observables. Ideally we would like systems to be completely
secure, but in practice this goal is often impossible to
achieve. Therefore it is important to express the amount of
leakage in quantitative terms, so to be able to assess whether
a system is better than another, although they may both be
insecure.
Several works in literature use an Information Theoretic
approach to model the problem and define the leakage in
a quantitative way, see for example [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7]. The idea is that the system is seen as a channel.
The input represents the secret, the output represents the
observable, and the correlation between the input and output
(mutual information) represents the information leakage.
The worst case leakage corresponds then to the capacity of
the channel, which is by definition the maximum mutual
information that can be obtained by varying the input
distribution.
In the works mentioned above, the notion of mutual
information is based on Shannon entropy, which (because of
its mathematical properties) is the most established measure
of uncertainty. From the security point of view, this measure
corresponds to a particular model of attack and a particular
way of estimating the security threat (vulnerability of the
secret). Other notions have been considered, and argued
to be more appropriate for security in certain scenarios.
These include: Re´nyi min-entropy [8], [9], Bayes risk [10],
[11], guessing entropy [12], and marginal guesswork [13].
In Section II we will discuss their meaning and show how
they relate (or do not relate) to each other and to Shannon
entropy.
This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-
0169-01 PANDA and by the INRIA DRI Equipe Associe´e PRINTEMPS.
Whatever definition of uncertainty (i.e. vulnerability) we
want to adopt, the notion of leakage is inherent to the system
as can be expressed in a uniform way as the difference
between the initial uncertainty, i.e. the degree of ignorance
about the secret before we run the system, and the remaining
uncertainty, i.e. the degree of ignorance about the secret after
we run the system and observe its outcome. Following the
principle advocated by Smith [9], and by many others:
information leakage = initial uncertainty
−
remaining uncertainty
(1)
In (1), the initial uncertainty depends solely on the input
distribution, aka a priori distribution. Intuitively, the more
uniform this is, the less we know about the secret (in the
probabilistic sense). After we run the system, if there is a
probabilistic correlation between input and output, then the
observation of the output should increase our knowledge of
the secret. This is determined by the fact that the distribution
on the input changes: in fact we can update the probability
of each input with the corresponding conditional probability
of the same input, given the output. The new distribution
is called a posteriori distribution. In case input and output
are independent, then the a priori and the a posteriori
distributions coincide and the knowledge should remain the
same. In the following, we will use the attributes “a priori”
and “a posteriori” to refer to before and after the observation
of the output, respectively.
The above intuitions should be reflected by any reasonable
notion of uncertainty: it should be higher on more uniform
distributions, and it should decrease or remain equal with
the observation of related events.
If the uncertainty is expressed in terms of Shannon
entropy, then the initial uncertainty is the entropy of the
input, the remaining uncertainty is the conditional entropy
of the input given the output, and (1) matches exactly the
definition of mutual information. This justifies the notion of
leakage adopted in the works mentioned before ([1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7]).
The analogy between information flow in a system and a
(simple) channel works well when
(i) there is no nondeterminism, i.e. either the system is
deterministic, or purely probabilistic, and
(ii) there is a precise temporal relation between secrets and
observables in the computations; namely, the value of
the secret is chosen at the beginning of the computa-
tion, and, the computation of the system produces an
observable outcome, with a probability that depends
solely on the chosen input and on the system. Further-
more, each new run of the system is independent from
the previous ones.
Restriction (i) implies that for each secret there is exactly
one conditional probability distribution on the observables,
where the condition is the secret value. Restriction (ii)
ensures that this conditional distribution depends uniquely
on the system (not on the input distribution). These con-
ditional probabilities constitute the so-called matrix of the
channel. Note that in a (basic) information-theoretic channel
the matrix must be invariant with respect to the input
distribution, which is exactly what condition (ii) guarantees.
If a system is deterministic, then under the same input
each run produces always the same output, with probability
1. Therefore the matrix contains only 0’s and 1’s. The
problem of inferring the secret is still interesting though,
because the same output may correspond to different inputs.
If the system is probabilistic, i.e. it uses some randomized
mechanisms, then the matrix usually contains probabilities
different from 0 and 1.
Unfortunately, for real-life systems usually conditions (i)
and (ii) are too restrictive:
• Specifications typically need to use nondeterminism
in order to abstract from implementation details. This
is particularly compelling in the case of concurrent
and distributed systems: The order in which the var-
ious components get executed, and their interactions,
depend on scheduling policies that may differ from
implementation to implementation. Furthermore, even
if the scheduling policy is fixed, there are run time
circumstances that may influence the relative speed of
the processes. Nondeterminism is an unavoidable aspect
of concurrency.
• Secrets and observables often alternate and interact dur-
ing an execution. In particular, the choice of a new se-
cret may depend on previous observables. Furthermore,
new execution of the systems may depend on previous
ones. This may be due to the way the system works, or
to the presence of an active adversary that may use the
knowledge derived from previous observations to try
to tamper with the mechanisms of the system, with the
purpose of increasing the leakage. Examples of such
systems, that we call here interactive systems (were
interaction refers to the interplay between secrets and
observables), can be found in the area of game theory,
auction protocols, web servers, GUI applications, etc.
In this paper, we consider the challenges of extending the
information-theoretic approach when conditions (i) and (ii)
are lifted, and we illustrate two approaches that we have
recently proposed in [14] and [15].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in next sec-
tion we discuss and compare various notions of uncertainty
proposed in literature. In Section III we illustate our proposal
for modeling interactive systems and defining the notion
of leakage. In Section IV we recall briefly the possibilistic
approaches proposed in literature to characterize the absence
of leakage in nondeterministic systems, we discuss the prob-
lems that arise with respect to implementation refinement,
and those caused by the presence of omniscent schedulers.
We then illustrate our proposal to cope with nondeterminism.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND LEAKAGE
In this section we recall various definitions of uncertainty
proposed in literature, and we discuss the relation with
security attacks and the way of measuring their success. In
general we consider the kind of threats that in the model
of [16] are called brute-force guessing attacks, which can
be summarized as follows: The goal of the adversary is to
determine the value of a random variable. He can make
a series of queries to an oracle. Each query must have a
yes/no answer. In general the adversary is adaptive, i.e.
he can choose the next query depending on the answer to
the previous ones. We assume that the adversary knows the
probability distribution.
In the following, A,B denote two discrete random vari-
ables with carriers A = {a1, . . . , an}, B = {b1, . . . , bm},
and probability distributions pA(·), pB(·), respectively. We
will use A ∧ B to represent the random variable with
carrier A×B and joint probability distribution pA∧B(a, b) =
pA(a) · p(b | A = a), while A · B will denote the random
variable with carrier A × B and probability distribution
defined as product, i.e. pA·B(a, b) = pA(a) · pB(b). Clearly,
if A and B are independent, we have A ∧ B = A · B.
We shall omit the subscripts on the probabilities when they
are clear from the context. In reference to a channel, in
general A will denote the input (secret), and B the output
(observable).
A. Shannon entropy
The Shannon entropy of A [17] is defined as
H(A) = −
∑
a∈A
p(a) log p(a)
The minimum value H(A) = 0 is obtained when p(·) is
concentrated on a single value (i.e. when p(·) is a delta of
Dirac). The maximum value H(A) = log |A| is obtained
when p(·) is the uniform distribution. Usually the base of
the logarithm is set to be 2 and, correspondingly, the entropy
is measured in bits.
The conditional entropy of A given B is
H(A | B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b) H(A | B = b) (2)
where
H(A | B = b) = −
∑
a∈A
p(a|b) log p(a|b)
We can prove that 0 ≤ H(A | B) ≤ H(A). The minimum
value, 0, is obtained when A is completely determined by
B. The maximum value H(A) is obtained when B reveals
no information about A, i.e. when A and B are independent.
The mutual information between A and B is defined as
I(A;B) = H(A)−H(A | B) (3)
and it measures the amount of information about A that
we gain by observing B. It can be shown that I(A;B) =
I(B;A) and 0 ≤ I(A;B) ≤ H(A).
Meaning in security: To explain what H(A) represents
from the security point of view, consider a partition {Ai}i∈I
of A. The adversary is allowed to ask questions of the form
“is A ∈ Ai?” according to some strategy. Let n(a) be the
number of questions that are needed to determine the value
of a, when A = a. Then H(A) represents the lower bound
to the expected value of n(·), with respect to all possible
partitions and strategies of the adversary [13], [16].
B. Re´nyi min-entropy
In [8], Re´nyi introduced a one-parameter family of en-
tropy measures, intended as a generalization of Shannon
entropy. The Re´nyi entropy of order α (α > 0, α 6= 1)
of a random variable A is defined as
Hα(A) =
1
1− α log
∑
a∈A
p(a)α
Re´nyi’s motivations were of axiomatic nature: Shannon
entropy satisfies four axioms, namely symmetry, continuity,
value 1 on the Bernoulli uniform distribution, and the chain
rule1:
H(A ∧B) = H(A |B) +H(B) (4)
(The entropy of the joint probability, H(A ∧ B), is more
commonly denoted by H(A,B). We will use the latter
notation in the following.)
Shannon entropy is also the only function that satisfies
those axioms. However, if we replace (4) with a weaker
property representing the additivity of entropy for indepen-
dent distributions:
H(A ·B) = H(A) +H(B) (5)
then there are more functions satisfying the axioms, among
which all those of the Re´nyi’s family.
1The original axiom, called the grouping axiom, does not mention
the conditional entropy. However it corresponds to the chain rule if the
conditional entropy is defined as in (2).
Shannon entropy is obtained by taking the limit of Hα as
α approaches 1. In fact we can easily prove, using l’Hoˆpital’s
rule, that
H1(A)
def
= lim
α→1
Hα(A) = −
∑
a∈A
p(a) log p(a)
We are particularly interested in the limit of Hα as α
approaches ∞. This is called min-entropy. It can be proven
that
H∞(A)
def
= lim
α→∞Hα(A) = − log maxa∈A p(a)
Re´nyi considered also the α-generalization of the
Kullback-Liebler divergence, which is defined as (assuming
that p and q are distributions on the same set X ):
DKL(p ‖ q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
Re´nyi’s α-generalization is:
Dα(p ‖ q) = 1
1− α log
∑
x∈X
p(x)α q(x)α−1
The standard case, i.e. the Kullback-Liebler divergence, is
again obtained by taking the limit of Dα as α→ 1.
The interest of the above for our purposes lies on the
fact that Shannon mutual information can equivalently be
defined in terms of the Kullback-Liebler divergence (see for
instance [10]):
I(A;B) = DKL(A ∧B ‖ A ·B)
Therefore, it seems natural to define the α-generalization of
the mutual information as:
Iα(A;B) = Dα(A ∧B ‖ A ·B) (6)
Other α-generalizations of the mutual information, based on
the same idea, are explored in [18].
As α→∞, the above definition gives the following min-
version of the mutual information:
I∞(A;B)
def
= lim
α→∞ Iα(A;B) = log maxa,b
p(a, b)
p(a) p(b)
(7)
Another natural way to generalize I(A;B) would be to
replace H by Hα in Definition (3). However, Re´nyi did not
define the α-generalization of the conditional entropy, and
there is no agreement on what it should be.
Various researchers, including Cachin [19], have consid-
ered the following definition, based on (2):
HCachinα (A | B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b) Hα(A | B = b) (8)
which, as α→∞, becomes
HCachin∞ (A | B) = −
∑
b∈B
p(b) log max
a∈A
p(a | b) (9)
An alternative proposal for H∞(· | ·) came from Smith [9]:
HSmith∞ (A | B) = − log
∑
b∈Bmaxa∈A p(a, b) (10)
Using (9), (10), and the analogue of (3) we can define
ICachin∞ and I
Smith
∞ .
Meaning in security: Re´nyi min-entropy can be related
to a model of adversary who is allowed to ask exactly one
question, which must be of the form “is A = a?” (one-try
attacks). More precisely, H∞(A) represents the (logarithm
of the inverse of the) probability of success for this kind of
attacks and with the best strategy, which consists, of course,
in choosing the a with the maximum probability.
As for H∞(A | B) and I∞(A;B), the most interesting
versions, in terms of security, seem to be those of Smith:
In fact, HSmith∞ (A | B) represents the inverse of the
(expected value of the) probability that the same kind of
adversary succeeds in guessing the value of A a posteriori,
i.e. after observing the result of B. The complement of this
probability is also known as probability of error or Bayes
risk. Since in general B and A are correlated, observing B
increases the probability of success. In fact we can prove
formally that HSmith∞ (A | B) ≤ HSmith∞ (A), with equality
if and only if A and B are independent. ISmith∞ (A;B)
corresponds to the ratio between the probabilities of success
a priori and a posteriori, which is a natural notion of leakage.
(ISmith∞ (A;B) is in the format of (1), but the difference
becomes ratio due to the presence of the logarithms.) Note
that ISmith∞ (A;B) ≥ 0, which seems desirable for a good
notion of leakage.
The definition of I∞ in (7) has also an interpretation in
security: it represents the maximum gain in the probability of
success, i.e. the maximum ratio between the a posteriori and
the a priori probability. Note that also I∞(A;B) is always
non-negative and it is 0 if and only if A and B are indepen-
dent. Furthermore I∞(A;B) coincides with ISmith∞ if B is
uniformly distributed. More in general, DKL(p ‖ q) and its
α-extension Dα(p ‖ q) should represent the “inefficiency”
of an adversary who bases its strategy on the distribution
q, when in fact the real distribution is p. Hence Iα(A;B)
defined as Dα(A ∧ B ‖ A · B) should represent the gain
of the adversary in revising his strategy according to the
knowledge of the correlation between A and B.
Concerning HCachinα and I
Cachin
α , they have some nice
properties. For instance they enjoy weak versions of the
chain rule (4). More precisely, the “=” in (4) becomes “≥”
for α < 1, and “≤” for α > 1. However, there is no general
relation between HCachin∞ (A | B) and H∞(A), and therefore
ICachin∞ is not guaranteed to be non-negative.
C. Guessing entropy
The notion of guessing entropy was introduced by Massey
in [12]. Let us assume, for simplicity, that the elements of A
are ordered by decreasing probabilities, i.e. if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
then p(ai) ≥ p(aj). Then the guessing entropy is defined as
follows:
HG(A) =
∑
1≤i≤|A|
i p(ai)
Massey did not define the notion of conditional guessing
entropy. In some works, like [19], [16], it is defined analo-
gously to (2):
HG(A | B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b) HG(A | B = b)
Meaning in security: Guessing entropy represents an
adversary who is allowed to ask repeatedly questions of the
form “is A = a?”. More precisely, HG(A) represents the
expected number of questions that the adversary needs to
ask to determine the value of A, assuming that he follows
the best strategy, which consists, of course, in choosing the
a’s in order of decreasing probability.
HG(A | B) represents the expected number of questions a
posteriori, i.e. after observing the value of B and reordering
the queries according to the updated probabilities (i.e. the
queries will be chosen in order of decreasing a posteriori
probabilities).
Also in this case, HG(A | B) is not necessarily smaller
than or equal to HG(A), so the corresponding notion of
mutual information is not guaranteed to be non-negative2.
D. Marginal guesswork
The marginal guesswork is a variant of guessing entropy
that was proposed by Pliam [13]. It is parametric to a number
ε > 0, and is defined as follows. Again, we assume that the
elements of A are ordered by decreasing probabilities.
Hε(A) = min{j |
∑
1≤i≤j
p(ai) > ε}
Pliam did not define the conditional version of marginal
guesswork, but in [16] it is defined following (2):
Hε(A | B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b) Hε(A | B = b)
Meaning in security: Consider again an adversary who
is allowed to ask repeatedly questions of the form “is A =
a?”. H(A) represents the minimum number of questions
that the adversary needs to ask to determine the value of A
with probability at least .
Hε(A | B) represents the same notion, but using the a
posteriori probabilities. Again, it is not necessarily the case
that Hε(A | B) ≤ Hε(A).
2This problem is inherent to the probabilistic case, and therefore it does
not occur in [16], since that work considers only deterministic systems.
E. Comparison and Discussion
The various notions of entropy discussed in this section
have been carefully compared with Shannon entropy, to
conclude that in general there is no tight relation. Fano’s
inequality gives a lower bound to the Bayes risk in terms
of (conditional) Shannon entropy, and Re´nyi [20], Hellman-
Raviv [21], and Santhi-Vardi [22] give upper bounds as well,
but all these are rather weak. Smith has shown in [9] that
the orderings induced on channels by the Bayes risk and by
Shannon entropy are in general unrelated.
Massey has shown that the exponential of the Shannon
entropy is a lower bound for the guessing entropy, and
that, in case of a geometric distribution, the bound is tight.
However Massey has also shown that in the general case
the Shannon entropy can be arbritrarily close to 0 while the
guessing entropy is constant [12].
As for the marginal guesswork. Pliam has shown that it
is essentially unrelated with Shannon entropy [13].
We conclude this section with an observation about the
principle (1). As we have seen above this principle prescribes
that, given a model of attack (and a measure of success), one
should find the corresponding notion of entropy and condi-
tional entropy, which will then be considered as the initial
and the residual uncertainty, respectively. The tendency in
literature is to define the conditional entropy following the
formula (2).
It is important to realize that the notion of probability
enters the definition of entropy in two ways: one corresponds
to the use of them made by the adversary to decide its
strategy. The other is for averaging purposes. While the
distribution used in the first way depends on the knowledge
of the adversary, and changes from a priori to a posteriori
with the revelation of the observable, the distribution used
in the second way should always be the real one, i.e. the
a posteriori one. Some of the definitions of entropy given
previously do not satisfy this rule, and in fact we obtain the
counterintuitive consequence that the a posteriori uncertainty
may be higher than the a priori one.
An alternative of the principle (1) would be to define the
leakage as information flow directly by using a suitable
variant of the Kullback-Liebler divergence, like in (6).
As discussed at the end of Section II-B, this divergence
represents the “inefficiency” of an adversary who bases
its strategy on the distribution q, when in fact the real
distribution is p. So, the new principle would be:
Leakage = effectiveness of the attack using the
a posteriori distribution
−
effectiveness of the attack using the
a priori distribution
where the computations are done taking into account that
the real distribution is the a posteriori one. In the case of
Shannon entropy this new principle coincides with (1), but
in general they are different.
For instance, in the case of the guessing entropy, we
should define IG(A;B) as the expected value (averaged us-
ing the a posteriori probabilities) of the divergence between
the number of queries when the a’s are ordered using the
a priori distribution on A, and the number of queries when
the a’s are ordered using the a posteriori distribution on A.
IG(A;B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b)
∑
1≤i≤|A|
i (p(ai | b)− p(aki | b)) (11)
where ki is a permutation which reorders the elements of A
so that their a posteriori probabilities are decreasing, namely
if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, then p(aki) ≥ p(akj ).
Note that, if we applied (3) with the definitions of
guessing entropy given above, we would obtain, instead:
IG(A;B) =
∑
b∈B
p(b)
∑
1≤i≤|A|
i (p(ai)− p(aki | b))
It is possible to prove that, if defined as in (11), then
IG(A;B) is always non-negative.
III. INTERACTIVE INFORMATION FLOW
In this section we consider the applicability of the
information-theoretic approach to interactive systems, i.e.
those systems in which there can be an alternation of
secrets and observables during the computation, and they
influence each other. The conditional probabilities p(b | a)
can be computed as the ratio between the probability that a
computation has trace (a, b), given that it has secret trace a
[23]. This is natural and correct, as it follows the definition
of conditional probability in terms of joint and marginal
probability. However, as shown by the example below, it
does not help to define an information-theoretic channel
because by definition a channel should be invariant with
respect to the input distribution, and such construction is
not.
Example: Consider the protocol represented in Fig-
ure 1. This protocol is used in a website with one seller
and two possible buyers (one of them is poor and the other
rich). The sale starts with the seller offering a product, which
can be either cheap (with probability r) or expensive (with
probability 1− r). In case the offered product is cheap, the
poor buyer aquires the product with probability s whereas
the rich buyer does it with probability 1−s. Similarly (with
probabilities t and 1− t) for the case on which the offered
product is expensive. We assume that the offered product
is observable, since it is visible to everyone in the website,
while the identity of the buyer is secret. In the following,
we use the notation r to represent 1− r.
If we want to build the channel matrix, one could think of
using the standard formula for conditional probability p(b |
a) = p(a,b)p(a) to fill each entry of the matrix. That is what is
r r
s s t t
cheap expensive
poor rich poor rich
Figure 1. Interactive System
cheap expensive
poor rs
rs+rt
rt
rs+rt
rich rs
rs+rt
rt
rs+rt
Table I
CHANNEL MATRIX
indeed proposed in [23]. Proceeding this way we obtain the
matrix on Table I.
However, the entries of the matrix are not invariant with
respect to the input distribution. If we fix the parameters
r = r = 0.5 and make two different assignments to the
values of s, s, t, t we induce two different input distributions,
with the associated matrices, as shown in Table II.
(a) r = 1
2
, s = 2
5
, t = 3
5
cheap expensive Marginal pA(·)
poor 2
5
3
5
1
4
rich 8
15
7
15
3
4
(b) r = 1
2
, s = 1
10
, t = 3
10
cheap expensive Marginal pA(·)
poor 1
4
3
4
1
2
rich 9
16
7
16
1
2
Table II
TWO DIFFERENT CHANNEL MATRICES DEPENDING ON THE INPUT
DISTRIBUTION
As shown by this example, when secrets occur after
observables the conditional probabilities depend on the dis-
tribution on secrets and, thus, so it does the matrix making
it unsound to analyze such systems using information-
theoretical approaches.
In [14], we investigate an extension of the theory of simple
channels so to make the information-theoretic approach
applicable also the case of interactive systems. It turns
out that a richer notion of channels, known in Information
Theory as channels with memory and feedback, serves our
purposes. Indeed the dependence of inputs on past outputs
corresponds exactly to feedback, and the dependence of the
output on all previous inputs and outputs corresponds to
memory.
A. Applications
Interactive systems can be found in a variety of disparate
areas such as game theory, auction protocols, and zero-
knowledge proofs. We now present two examples of inter-
active systems.
• In the area of auction protocols, consider the cocaine
auction protocol [24]. The auction is organized as a
succession of rounds of bidding. Round i starts with the
seller announcing the bid price bi for that round. Buyers
have t seconds to make an offer (i.e. to say yes, meaning
“I am willing to buy at the current bid price bi”). As
soon as one buyer says yes, he becomes the winner
wi of that round and a new round begins. If nobody
says anything for t seconds, round i is concluded by
timeout and the auction is won by the winner wi−1 of
the previous round.
The identities of the buyers in each round constitute the
input of the channel, whereas the bid prices constitute
the output of the channel. Note that inputs and outputs
alternate so the system is interactive. It is also easy
to see that inputs depend on past outputs (feedback):
the identity of the winner of each round depends on
the previous bid prices. Furthermore, outputs depend
on the previous inputs (memory): (in some scenarios)
the bid price of round i may depend on the identity of
previous winners. For more details on the modeling of
this protocol using channels with memory and feedback
see [14].
• In the area of game theory, consider the classic pris-
oner’s dilemma (the present formulation is due to
Albert W. Tucker [25], but it was originally devised
by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950). Two
suspects are arrested by the police. The police have
insufficient evidence for a conviction, and, having sep-
arated both prisoners, visit each of them to offer the
same deal. If one testifies (defects from the other) for
the prosecution against the other and the other remains
silent (cooperates with the other), the betrayer goes
free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-
year sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners
are sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor
charge. If each betrays the other, each receives a five-
year sentence. Each prisoner must choose to betray the
other or to remain silent. Each one is assured that the
other would not know about the betrayal before the end
of the investigation.
In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the game is played
repeatedly. Thus each player has an opportunity to
punish the other player for previous non-cooperative
play. In this case the strategy (cooperate or defect)
of each player is the input of the channel and the
sentence is the output. Once again, it is easy to see that
the system is interactive: inputs and outputs alternate.
Furthermore, inputs depend on previous outputs (the
strategy depend on the past sentences) and outputs
depend on previous inputs (the sentence of the suspects
depend on their declarations - cooperate or defect).
IV. NONDETERMINISM AND INFORMATION FLOW
As seen in previous Section II, the noise of the channel,
namely the similarity between the rows of the channel
matrix, helps preventing the inference of the secret from the
observables. In practice noise is created by using randomiza-
tion, see for instance the DCNet [26] and the Crowds [27]
protocols.
In the literature about the foundations of Computer Se-
curity, however, the quantitative aspects are often abstracted
away, and probabilistic behavior is replaced by nondeter-
ministic behavior. Correspondingly, there have been various
approaches in which information-hiding properties are ex-
pressed in terms of equivalences based on nondeterminism,
especially in a concurrent setting. For instance, [28] defines
anonymity as follows3: A protocol S is anonymous if, for
every pair of culprits a and b, S[a/x] and S[b/x] produce
the same observable traces. A similar definition is given in
[29] for secrecy, with the difference that S[a/x] and S[b/x]
are required to be bisimilar. In [30], an electoral system S
preserves the confidentiality of the vote if for any voters v
and w, the observable behavior of S is the same if we swap
the votes of v and w. Namely, S[a/v |b /w] ∼ S[b/v |a /w],
where ∼ represents bisimilarity.
These proposals are based on the implicit assumption that
all the nondeterministic executions present in the specifica-
tion of S will always be possible under every implementation
of S. Or at least, that the adversary will believe so. In
concurrency, however, as argued in [31], nondeterminism
has a rather different meaning: if a specification S contains
some nondeterministic alternatives, typically it is because we
want to abstract from specific implementations, such as the
scheduling policy. A specification is considered correct, with
respect to some property, if every alternative satisfies the
property. Correspondingly, an implementation is considered
correct if all executions are among those possible in the
specification, i.e. if the implementation is a refinement of the
specification. There is no expectation that the implementa-
tion will actually make possible all the alternatives indicated
by the specification.
We argue that the use of nondeterminism in concurrency
corresponds to a demonic view: the scheduler, i.e. the entity
that will decide which alternative to select, may try to choose
the worst alternative. Hence we need to make sure that “all
alternatives are good”, i.e. satisfy the intended property.
In the above mentioned approaches to the formalization
of security properties, on the contrary, the interpretation
3The actual definition of [28] is more complicated, but the spirit is the
same.
of nondeterminism is angelic: the scheduler is expected to
actually help the protocol to confuse the adversary and thus
protect the secret information.
There is another issue, orthogonal to the angelic/demonic
dichotomy, but relevant for the achievement of security prop-
erties: the scheduler should not be able to make its choices
dependent on the secret, or else nearly every protocol would
be insecure, i.e. the scheduler would always be able to leak
the secret to an external observer (for instance by producing
different interleavings of the observables, depending on the
secret). This remark has been made several times already,
and several approaches have been proposed to cope with
the problem of the “almighty” scheduler (aka omniscient,
clairvoyant, etc.), see for example [32], [33], [31], [34].
The risk of a naive use of nondeterminism to specify a
security property, is not only that it may rely on an implicit
assumption that the scheduler behaves angelically, but also
that it is clairvoyant, i.e. that it peeks at the secrets (that
it is not supposed to be able to see) to achieve its angelic
strategy.
Consider the following system, in a CCS-like syntax:
S
def
= (c, out)(A ‖ Corr ‖ H1 ‖ H2),
A
def
= c〈sec〉, Corr def= c(s).out〈s〉
H1
def
= c(s).out〈a〉, H2 def= c(s).out〈b〉
where ‖ is the parallel operator, c〈sec〉 is a process that
sends sec on channel c, c(s).P is a process that receives s
on channel c and then continues as P , and (c, out) is the
restriction operator, enforcing synchronization on c and out .
In this example, sec represents a secret information.
It is easy to see that we have S [a/sec] ∼ S
[
b/sec
]
. Note
that, in order to simulate the third branch in S [a/sec], the
process S
[
b/sec
]
needs to select its first branch. Viceversa,
in order to simulate the third branch in S
[
b/sec
]
, the process
S [a/sec] needs to select its second branch. This means that,
in order to achieve bisimulation, the scheduler needs to know
the secret, and change its choice accordingly.
This example shows a system that intuitively is not secure,
because the third component, Corr , reveals whatever secret
it receives. However, according to the equivalence-based
notions of security discussed above, it is secure. But it is
secure thanks to a scheduler that angelically helps the system
to protect the secret, and it does so by making its choices
dependent on the secret! In our opinion these assumptions
on the scheduler are excessively strong.
In a recent work [15] we address the above issue by
defining a framework in which it is possible to combine both
angelic and demonic nondeterminism in a setting in which
also probabilistic behavior may be present, and in a context
in which the scheduler is restricted (i.e. not clairvoyant).
We propose safe versions of typical equivalence relations
(traces and bisimulation), and we show how to use them to
characterize information-hiding properties.
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